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INTRODUCTION
Overcriminalization is often viewed as an issue about whether conduct
should be punished criminally or whether it should be left to a civil
adjudication of rights and remedies, including a governmental civil
enforcement suit. The label “criminal” is a special one that connotes
society’s condemnation of certain conduct as deserving punishment, but it
is also the community’s moral judgment that certain conduct is wrongful.
Professor Sanford H. Kadish asserted almost forty years ago “that the
criminal law is a highly specialized tool of social control . . . that when
improperly used it is capable of producing more evil than good.”1 When
the legislature defines ever-wider forms of conduct as crimes, the
effectiveness of criminal law as both a deterrent and a means of affixing
moral blameworthiness may be substantially diminished. As such, overuse
of the criminal law risks its utility to society.2
*
**

© 2005 Peter J. Henning.
Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. I appreciate the comments
and suggestions provided by the Wayne State University Law School faculty at a
presentation on the topic, and to Professor Ellen S. Podgor.
1. Sanford H. Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 374 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL.
& SOC. SCI. 157, 169 (1967).
2. See Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 Am. U. L. Rev. 703, 713
(2005) (Overcriminalization Aencompasses a broad array of issues, including: what should
be denominated a crime and when it should be enforced; who falls within the law's strictures
or, conversely, avoids liability altogether; and what should be the boundaries of punishment
and the proper sentence in specific cases.@); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful”
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The primary focus of those who condemn overcriminalization is on the
legislature’s role in expanding the types of conduct that will be labeled
criminal.3 However, the role of the prosecutor in applying the law is also
relevant to the overcriminalization debate.4 Regardless of the scope of the
laws enacted by legislatures, the prosecutor decides what charges to file,
and whether the law should be applied in a mundane or novel manner.
Professor William J. Stuntz argues that “the story of American criminal law
is a story of tacit cooperation between prosecutors and legislators, each of
whom benefits from more and broader crimes, and growing
marginalization of judges, who alone are likely to opt for narrower liability
rules rather than broader ones.”5 This is especially true at the federal level,
Mean “Criminal”?: Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American
Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 193 (1991) (arguing that criminalizing negligent and intentional
behavior blurs the distinction between tort and crime and, as a result, weakens the criminal
law as a means of social control).
3. See, e.g., Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Winter 1958, at 401, 417 (stating critically, “The statute books of the forty-nine
states and the United States are filled with enactments carrying a criminal sanction which
are obviously motivated by other ends, primarily, than that of training responsible
citizenship.”). See generally Sanford H. Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal
Sanctions to Enforce Economic Regulations, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 423 (1963) (outlining the
problems inherent in a criminal justice approach to economic regulation).
4. See Stuart P. Green, Why It’s a Crime to Tear the Tag Off a Mattress:
Overcriminalization and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533,
1545-46 (1997) (“There are two senses in which criminal sanctions might be said to be
‘overused.’ One is that such sanctions are over-authorized by Congress and the state
legislatures. The other is that, where authorized, they are over-applied by prosecutors and
courts.”).
5. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV.
505, 510 (2001). A parallel development exists involving the federalization of the criminal
law. Certainly, the Supreme Court has, in some instances, criticized the extension of federal
jurisdiction over common street crimes. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68
(1995), which struck down the Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990 as an improper use of
Congress’s Commerce Clause authority, and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627
(2000), which struck down 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994), a part of the Violence Against
Women Act of 1994, because it exceeded Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.
However, there is a trend toward adding to the number of federal laws that can be used to
punish conduct already subject to state prosecution. The effect of this coordination of
prosecutions enhances the penalties that can be imposed. For example, this past year,
Congress adopted a law making it a federal crime to murder a fetus, largely in response to
the murder of Laci Peterson and her unborn child. See Unborn Victims of Violence Act of
2004 (Laci and Connor’s Law), Pub. L. No. 108-212, 118 Stat. 568 (2004) (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 1841 (2004)). This is already a crime in most states. See Alan S. Wasserstrom,
Homicide Based on Killing Unborn Child, 64 A.L.R. 671, 689-740 (5th ed. 2004) (detailing
how various states prosecute the killing of unborn children). Similarly, a Department of
Justice initiative called “Project Safe Neighborhoods” moves individuals charged with
crimes in state court into the federal system when they have prior arrests and possessed a
weapon at the time of their offense, which under federal sentencing laws triggers a
significantly increased sentence.
See Project Safe Neighborhoods, Project Safe
Neighborhood Initiative Launched On Long Island—Sixteen Prior Felony Offenders Face
Federal Firearms Charges (July 2, 2002), at http://www.psn.gov/Safer.asp?section=123 (on
file with the American University Law Review). The federalization of law enforcement can
be used as a tool to impose ever-increasing sentences on those who would normally be
subject to prosecution only in a state court. Id.
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where the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has been quite effective in getting
Congress to approve legislation enacting broader crimes and—at least until
recently—in shifting much of the power to set sentences to federal
prosecutors.6
The recent spate of misconduct in large, publicly traded corporations has
led to what can be viewed as a new form of overcriminalization—the
targeting of legal advice as an obstacle in pursuing the investigation of
corporate wrongdoing. This form of overcriminalization does not involve
the adoption of new laws or an attempt to have courts adopt a new
interpretation of an older statute to address changed circumstances. It is
hardly the case that federal prosecutors need new criminal statutes to
prosecute misconduct by corporations and their managers, as they already
have mail/wire fraud,7 securities fraud,8 obstruction of justice,9 and false
statement10 prohibitions.
The difficulty prosecutors face in prosecuting corporate misconduct and
other types of white collar crimes is identifying the particular acts that
violate the statute, and then amassing sufficient proof of intent to establish
that a crime has occurred. White collar crime investigations frequently
take months, even years, to complete, and prosecutors must dig through
mounds of records to determine who is responsible for the misconduct.11
Except for some narrow regulatory and environmental crimes that are strict
liability offenses, corporate crimes almost always require proof of specific
intent.12 It is rare when prosecutors do not have to use circumstantial
evidence to argue that the defendant(s)—both individual and
organizational—had the requisite knowledge or purpose.
When a corporation’s officers are the targets of the investigation, counsel
will usually represent them, often paid by the corporation. The presence of
6. See Stuntz, supra note 5, at 545 (observing Congress’s willingness to give in to the
demands of federal prosecutors even if their demands are inconsistent with the goals of the
public).
7. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (2004).
8. 18 U.S.C. § 1348.
9. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1518.
10. 18 U.S.C. § 1001.
11. For example, indictments of senior officers of Enron did not occur until over two
years after the company’s bankruptcy, and the first criminal trial involving an Enron
transaction only began in September 2004.
12. See, e.g., United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 435, 441-43
(1978) (refusing to hold that the Sherman Act imposes strict liability on corporations or
corporate officials for anti-competitive behavior, in part because strict liability in the context
of corporate crime could deter businesses from engaging in “salutary and procompetitive
conduct lying close to the borderline of impermissible conduct” for fear of punishing goodfaith mistakes of judgment). Noting that actors subjected to strict liability will exercise
extraordinary care in their undertakings, the Court distinguished the antitrust context, in
which over-regulation will discourage legitimate business activity to the public’s detriment,
from laws regulating food, in which “excessive” caution by producers will promote the
public good. Id. at 441 n.17.
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lawyers—frequently from large law firms with fairly sophisticated white
collar crime practice groups that are stocked full of former federal
prosecutors—makes the investigatory process much more complicated
because skilled counsel know how to protect clients in these types of
investigations and how to bargain for reduced charges and sentences.13
In 2003, the then-Deputy Attorney General Larry D. Thompson issued a
memorandum with the title “Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business
Organizations” (the “Thompson Memorandum”), which announced a set of
principles to guide federal prosecutors in deciding whether to charge a
corporation with a crime.14 Among the principles federal prosecutors
should consider are “the corporation’s timely and voluntary disclosure of
wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its
agents, including, if necessary, the waiver of corporate attorney-client and
work product protection.”15 While most commentary about the Thompson
Memorandum focused on the waiver issue, there is another aspect that
discloses an even more disturbing view regarding legal advice. In
assessing cooperation, the Thompson Memorandum states that the
prosecutor should consider “whether the corporation appears to be
protecting its culpable employees and agents” and can consider “the

13. See Stuart P. Green, Moral Ambiguity in White Collar Criminal Law, 18 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 501, 516-17 (2004) (“Highly paid white collar criminal
defense lawyers are more successful at almost every stage in the criminal justice process
than their public defender counterparts. They do a better job of persuading prosecutors not
to indict, preventing the prosecution from obtaining evidence needed to convict, keeping
witnesses from talking to prosecutors, presenting their case in the media, obtaining
favorable plea bargains, pursuing post-conviction appeals, and arguing mitigation in
sentencing.”).
14. Memorandum from Larry Thompson, Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, to Heads of Department Components and United States Attorneys (Jan. 20, 2003)
[hereinafter
Thompson
Memorandum],
available
at
http://www.usdoj.
gov/dag/cftf/corporate_guidelines.htm. Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder, Thomson’s
predecessor, issued a similar memorandum in 1999. See Memorandum from Eric H.
Holder, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to All Heads of Department
Components and United States Attorneys (June 16, 1999) (discussing the bringing of
criminal
charges
against
corporations),
available
at
http://www.usdoj.gov:80/criminal/fraud/policy/Chargingcorps.html.
The Thompson
Memorandum sought to explain in greater detail the DOJ’s position on the issue of charging
corporations:
The main focus of the revisions is increased emphasis on and scrutiny of the
authenticity of a corporation’s cooperation. Too often business organizations,
while purporting to cooperate with a Department investigation, in fact take steps to
impede the quick and effective exposure of the complete scope of wrongdoing
under investigation. The revisions make clear that such conduct should weigh in
favor of a corporate prosecution. The revisions also address the efficacy of the
corporate governance mechanisms in place within a corporation, to ensure that
these measures are truly effective rather than mere paper programs.
Thompson Memorandum, supra, at Introduction.
15. Id. at II.
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advancing of attorneys [sic] fees” and sharing information pursuant to a
joint defense agreement.16
The payment of attorney’s fees by a corporation is not a failure of
cooperation unless one views the presence of a lawyer for a corporate
officer as an impediment to an investigation. A lawyer is unlikely to
recommend that a client, who is the target of an investigation, cooperate
with the government, or at least, not without the protection of an immunity
agreement or plea bargain. This does not mean the lawyer’s advice is
wrongful or designed to obstruct justice.
Similarly, a joint defense agreement17 facilitates the pooling of
information and representational tasks among lawyers representing
different parties who share a common interest. Courts recognize the
propriety of joint defense agreements as an extension of the attorney-client
privilege,18 and therefore, any discussions pursuant to these agreements
will not be available to the government without a waiver by every
participant in the agreement.19 Although the privilege makes it more
difficult to gather information, one of the foundations of our legal system is
that the government cannot compel disclosure of privileged
communications absent proof that they were made to further a crime or
fraud.20
Defense lawyers representing individual officers certainly can make it
more difficult for the government to investigate corporate misconduct.
However, that alone is hardly a justification for viewing the payment of
attorney’s fees or a joint defense agreement—both of which are completely
legal and reasonable decisions by the lawyer—as a sign that a corporation
is not cooperating with an investigation.21
16. Id. at VI.B.
17. See The Corporate Counsel Section of the New York State Bar Association, Legal
Development: Report on Cost-Effective Management of Corporate Litigation, 59 ALB. L.
REV. 263, 310 (defining a joint defense agreement as a written agreement between multiple
defendants who have, at a minimum, a willingness to cooperate on the case by sharing
litigation costs and by preserving confidential information and may include an agreement to
delegate particular responsibilities to certain defendants).
18. See, e.g., infra note 142.
19. See Lawrence D. Finder, Internal Investigations: Consequences of the Federal
Deputation of Corporate America, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 111, 113 (2003) (citing United States
v. Almeida, 341 F.3d 1318, 1324 (11th Cir. 2003), for the proposition that even though
federal prosecutors dislike the use of joint defense agreements, it is highly unusual for the
government to threaten prosecution for merely participating in a joint defense agreement).
20. See, e.g., United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562-63 (1989) (noting the existence
of a crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege).
21. See John Hasnas, Ethics and the Problem of White Collar Crime, 54 Am. U. L. Rev.
579, 584 (2005) (noting that business people “have contractual, as well as informal
customary obligations to their employees, customers, and suppliers. Further, they have their
ordinary ethical obligations as human beings to honor their commitments and to deal
honestly with others. These obligations can, and to an increasing extent do, conflict with the
obligation to take the most effective steps to comply with federal law. When the law
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The drive to prosecute corporate misconduct, which frequently involves
questionable but not obviously criminal conduct, has led the DOJ to adopt a
position that views its ability to prosecute corporate crime as being
hamstrung by the presence of lawyers.22 More than a nuisance, the DOJ
views lawyers as a roadblock to criminal prosecution that, apparently, now
requires the government to take a more aggressive approach to limit, if not
eliminate, the protections afforded to the targets of an investigation.
This new tack is symptomatic of the DOJ’s broader push against
lawyers. I do not assert that there is a “war on defense lawyers” that is part
of a hitherto undisclosed plan to drive lawyers away from representing
corporate officers.23 There is, however, a trend towards using the criminal
law and the government’s investigatory tools against lawyers because of
what appears to be a deep-seated suspicion of legal advice as something
harmful or inappropriate. Lawyers commit crimes, and there is no claim
that they should be exempt from the application of the criminal law. But,
at the same time, the presence of a lawyer is not a red flag or in any way
nefarious. Prosecutors need to show greater respect for the attorney-client
relationship, including privileged communications. Efforts to enforce
criminal law, which make legal advice a target of prosecution and an
indicator of guilt, are a sure sign of overcriminalization.
Part I of the Article considers why prosecutors mistrust lawyers by
looking at cases involving lawyer misconduct that obstructs justice, and
how even acting ethically means that a lawyer can act to frustrate a
criminal prosecution. While lawyers are viewed with mistrust, cases
involving outright obstruction are rare and do not reflect the true role of
lawyers in representing clients in criminal cases. Part II assesses recent
cases in which federal prosecutors have targeted lawyers for prosecution,
provides incentives to violate one’s ethical duties to others, business people face a difficult
choice. Federal prosecutors do not. Business people must decide the extent to which they
can ethically expose their firm to the risk of legal liability in order to meet their other
obligations. Federal prosecutors, whose only obligation is to the law, need only judge the
level of the firm’s legal compliance. Simply expressed, business people’s ethical dilemmas
are not federal prosecutors’ problem.”).
22. See generally Thompson Memorandum, supra note 14 (providing guidance for
lawyers working with cooperating corporations during a corporate fraud investigation and
noting that corporations may purport to be cooperating with a DOJ investigation, while
simultaneously trying to impede the DOJ’s discovery of the scope of the corporation’s
wrongdoing).
23. But see Finder, supra note 19, at 113 (contending that because of an increased
emphasis on corporate cooperation and indictment avoidance, companies essentially become
an investigatory arm of the government); David M. Zornow & Keith D. Krakaur, On the
Brink of a Brave New World: The Death of Privilege in Corporate Criminal Investigations,
37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 147, 147 (2000) (arguing that the government prefers turning
corporations into arms of law enforcement by emphasizing cooperation instead of
preserving principles at the heart of our adversarial system). The emphasis on cooperation
creates divisive relationships between senior management and employees because of senior
management’s rush to cooperate. Id.
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and asks whether the practice of law is starting to be viewed as potentially
criminal. Part III looks at the government=s most recent approach as
shown in pronouncements regarding legal advice as potentially obstructing
investigations of corporate misconduct. In my view, the Department of
Justice=s determination that a corporation providing a lawyer to an
employee in connection with a criminal investigation can be considered
obstructive. This approach denigrates legal advice and moves beyond mere
lawyer misconduct to seeking improperly the elimination of lawyers to
further the government=s own interests, at a significant cost to the targets
of corporate crime investigations.
I.

CAN’T WE TRUST LAWYERS?

The DOJ’s approach to legal advice reflects a broader mistrust of the
legal profession. At least as reflected in television police programs, for
which there is no shortage of fictional valorous officers solving complex
crimes, lawyers (sometimes including prosecutors) are obstacles to be
avoided or their legal advice is an unfortunate nuisance. More importantly,
it is assumed that a person—invariably the guilty suspect—who is advised
by a lawyer will never cooperate or provide valuable information. The job
of the lawyer, apparently, is to make it much more difficult for the police to
obtain information while shielding the guilty party from justice.24
The phrase “lawyering up” has entered the popular lexicon as meaning
that a person suspected of a crime will listen to the lawyer’s advice and will
not cooperate in the investigation, thus thwarting a successful
prosecution.25 Professors Bandes and Beermann described how, on the
television program NYPD Blue, the prospect of a lawyer advising an
investigatory target had significant ramifications:
The detectives understand that if the guy they like lawyers up, they
won’t get a confession. The relentless pursuit of the confession is driven
by the detectives’ assessment that they are unlikely to obtain a
conviction without one. In one episode, after Andy Sipowicz threatens
to beat up a suspect in the sexual assault and killing of a young girl
unless he confesses, another detective (not one of the regulars) criticizes
Sipowicz because the technique might have jeopardized the case by
scaring the suspect into lawyering up. It is not that coerced confessions
are wrong, it is that coercion, improperly employed, may result in a fate

24. The media assumption is incorrect at least in drug cases in which significant
mandatory minimum sentences create a powerful incentive for lawyers to engage in plea
discussions early on in an investigation and provide valuable information to prosecutors to
gain the government=s support for a departure from the required term of imprisonment.
25. See Adam Hanft, Neolawisms, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Feb. 2003, at 17 (explaining that
NYPD Blue popularized the term “lawyering up” when referring to the difficulty of
interrogating a suspect represented by a lawyer).
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worse than death, the appearance of a lawyer.26

There is no question that advising a person suspected of a crime to
decline an invitation to cooperate in an investigation, at least by not
speaking with the police before charges are filed, is proper and, indeed,
sound legal advice. It hardly needs to be said that the most damning
evidence in a criminal trial is the statement of the defendant admitting the
misconduct, regardless of any excuses or explanations that may be offered
for the conduct. Counseling a suspect to remain silent may frustrate the
police, but the criminal justice system imposes upon lawyers the absolute
duty to represent their clients within the bounds of the law.
For white collar and corporate crime investigations, the presence of
lawyers for targets, subjects, and witnesses is commonplace. It is rare
when a case does not involve an extended grand jury investigation,
subpoenas for large volumes of records, and witness proffers—all mediated
by lawyers for the company and individuals. Yet, even in these types of
investigations, prosecutors lament the presence of lawyers who slow down
the process.27
If lawyers only delayed investigations, there would be little reason to be
concerned by the presence of a lawyer except for the increased cost and
energy necessary to complete an investigation. However, there is more at
issue than just dilatory tactics by defense counsel. The fear must be that
lawyers, by their nature, obstruct criminal investigations. One example of
how lawyers are more than just an impediment is the notorious e-mail sent
by an Arthur Andersen lawyer to the audit partner on the Enron
engagement, seeking the removal of references to the involvement of the
firm’s in-house counsel from a memorandum regarding whether Enron’s
disclosures had been misleading.28 This single e-mail turned out to be the
26. Susan Bandes & Jack Beermann, Lawyering Up, 2 GREEN BAG 5, 9 (1998).
27. See Roscoe C. Howard, Jr., Wearing a Bull’s Eye: Observations on the Differences
Between Prosecuting for a United States Attorney’s Office and an Office of Independent
Counsel, 29 STETSON L. REV. 95, 146 (1999) (noting that, in the context of Independent
Counsel investigations of wrongdoing by high level officials, “lawyering up” increases the
duration of investigations due to the presence of lawyers). Similarly, Professor John Barrett,
another former Associate Independent Counsel, criticized the attorney’s fee provision of the
now-expired Independent Counsel Act for inviting individuals to hire lawyers:
It has become a trough that lawyers seek to feed in. And the prospect of this
ultimate reimbursement from the government seems to have encouraged all kinds
of “lawyering up,” often orchestrated by White House Counsel. It prolongs and
complicates Independent Counsel investigations when even the most minor
potential witnesses are represented by counsel who look forward to reimbursement.
And this provision obviously increases the public tab for an Independent Counsel’s
work.
John Q. Barrett, Independent Counsel Law Improvements for the Next Five Years, 51
ADMIN. L. REV. 631, 649 (1999).
28. See Green, supra note 13, at 504 (“Among the pieces of evidence that jurors found
most incriminating was an email from in-house Andersen lawyer, Nancy Temple,
instructing Andersen partner, David Duncan, to remove language from an internal Andersen
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crucial piece of evidence showing Arthur Andersen’s corrupt intent to
obstruct justice.29 The lawyer’s complicity was only emphasized when she
asserted her Fifth Amendment right and refused to testify at trial.30
How far can defense counsel go? In Nix v. Whiteside,31 the Supreme
Court made it clear that a defendant has no right to testify falsely, and that
a defense lawyer who knows that the client will commit perjury does not
violate the Sixth Amendment—or the ethical duties of the profession—by
threatening to disclose that fact to the court, even though the information is
privileged.32 The Court noted that “the legal profession has accepted that
an [sic] lawyer’s ethical duty to advance the interests of his client is limited
by an equally solemn duty to comply with the law and standards of
professional conduct; it specifically ensures that the client may not use
false evidence.”33 In Maness v. Meyers,34 the Court recognized that a
lawyer cannot be held in contempt for advising a client to assert the Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination and for refusing to turn over
documents protected by the privilege because of the effect it would have on
the provision of legal services.35 It rationalized, “If performance of a
lawyer’s duty to advise a client that a privilege is available exposes a
lawyer to the threat of contempt for giving honest advice, it is hardly
debatable that some advocates may lose their zeal for forthrightness and
independence.”36
The zealous defense lawyer can, and perhaps must, make it more
difficult for the government to obtain a conviction,37 but there is a limit to
the lawyer’s ability to secure an acquittal for the client. Can defense
lawyers cross over the line and obstruct justice in their representation of

memo suggesting that Andersen had concluded that an earlier Enron final disclosure had
been misleading. The email also advised Duncan to remove any reference to consultations
with Andersen’s in-house legal team, saying it could be considered a waiver of attorneyclient privilege.”).
29. See United States v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 374 F.3d 281, 286 (5th Cir. 2004), cert.
granted, 125 S. Ct. 823 (2005) (noting Temple’s reminder that Andersen staff should be in
compliance with the company’s document retention policy in the face of an upcoming
government investigation).
30. See Stephan Landsman, Death of an Accountant: The Jury Convicts Arthur
Andersen of Obstruction of Justice, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1203, 1217 (2003) (noting a
heightened sense of suspicion after Temple and others invoked their Fifth Amendment
rights).
31. 475 U.S. 157 (1986).
32. Id. at 173. The Court reasoned that the right to testify, at a minimum, does not
permit a person to testify falsely. Id.
33. Id. at 168.
34. 419 U.S. 449 (1975).
35. Id. at 470.
36. Id. at 466.
37. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2003) (stating that a lawyer for a
defendant in a criminal case may require the prosecution to prove every element of the
case).
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criminal defendants? The sad truth is that there are more than a few
examples to feed the perception that lawyers for criminal defendants will
actively mislead prosecutors and judges in seeking an acquittal for their
clients. In In re Foley,38 a defense lawyer’s dealings with an undercover
agent were captured on tape, including his persistent recommendation to
the “client” about concocting a defense to a weapons possession charge.39
In suspending the lawyer, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court stated,
“What is unusual about this case is our ability to perceive with full clarity
the depth of that misconduct and the ready ease with which the respondent
engaged in it. The respondent’s own words repeatedly reflect complete
disregard, if not utter contempt, for the fundamental ethical obligations of
an officer of the court.”40
One recurrent example of defense lawyer misconduct involving
deception involves substituting a different person for the defendant at the
defense table during trial to have a prosecution witness make an incorrect
identification of the person sitting next to the defense counsel as the
perpetrator of the crime.41 Once the misidentification occurs, the defendant
has a powerful argument that the witness’ testimony should not be credited
by the jury or court.
In People v. Simac,42 the Illinois Supreme Court upheld a criminal
contempt conviction of a defense lawyer who had a clerical worker from
his office sit next to him at the defense table while the defendant sat in the
back of the courtroom.43 He dressed one of them in a blue striped shirt and
the other in a red striped shirt.44 In arguing that the evidence did not
support the contempt charge, Simac asserted that he did not make any
affirmative misrepresentation to the court regarding the identity of the
clerical worker, as he carefully avoided any reference to him as the
defendant or his client.45 Rejecting that argument, the court stated that “an
38. 787 N.E.2d 561 (Mass. 2003).
39. Id. at 563-64.
40. Id. at 568.
41. JOHN WESLEY HALL, JR., PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE CRIMINAL LAWYER
§ 34:23, at 1178 (2d ed. 1996) (warning that a court may hold a lawyer in contempt of court
for substituting another person, without the court’s approval, to cause a misidentification of
the defendant). In In re Gross, 759 N.E.2d 288, 289, 294 (Mass. 2001), the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court imposed an eighteen-month suspension on a lawyer who “concocted
a plan” to have an alibi witness, who had a similar appearance to the defendant, impersonate
the defendant at the second call of the case in the hope that it would induce the victim to
misidentify the person who left the scene of an accident.
42. 641 N.E.2d 416 (Ill. 1994).
43. Id. at 417-18.
44. Id. at 418. After the police officer identified the clerical worker as the person
involved in the automobile accident, Simac called the clerical worker to testify to his true
identity. Id.
45. Id. at 419. When the officer identified the clerical worker as the person involved in
the accident, the trial judge stated for the record that the officer had identified “the
defendant.” Id. The Illinois Supreme Court found that Simac’s failure to take any action to

10/3/2005 1:35 PM

HENNING

2005]

TARGETING LEGAL ADVICE

679

attorney must not deceive the court as to the defendant’s identity despite
the attorney’s obligation to vigorously represent his client. Such a
deception prevents the court from fulfilling its obligation and derogates
from the court’s dignity and authority.”46 This is not an isolated example
of this tactic, which has been tried over the years and which, when spotted,
results in punishment for the defense lawyer.47
The question of whether a lawyer’s effort to deceive the court constitutes
obstruction of justice, rather than just an ethical violation or contempt of
court, arose in United States v. Kloess.48 Kloess, a defense lawyer, failed to
alert a state court that his client gave a false name when stopped for a
traffic violation and when found to be in possession of a firearm.49 The
client was on probation for a federal crime and could not possess a weapon,
so Kloess’ failure to reveal his client’s true identity to the state court
avoided having the client jailed for a federal probation violation.50 Kloess
was charged with obstruction of justice51 by federal prosecutors for his
conduct in state court.52 The charge required the government to prove that
he engaged in “misleading conduct” with the intent to “hinder, delay, or
prevent” information from being communicated to a federal judge about a
crime or probation violation.”53
In 18 U.S.C. § 1515(c), Congress provides lawyers with a defense to an
obstruction charge. The statute provides, “This chapter does not prohibit or
correct the judge’s misunderstanding was a deception. Id. at 422.
46. Id.
47. See United States v. Sabater, 830 F.2d 7, 9 (2d Cir. 1987) (maintaining that
substituting another person for the defendant at the defense table violated the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility); United States v. Thoreen, 653 F.2d 1332, 1343 (9th Cir. 1981)
(upholding a contempt conviction against an attorney who substituted another person for his
client at the counsel table to cause a misidentification); Miskovsky v. State ex rel. Jones,
586 P.2d 1104, 1109-10 (Okla. Crim. App. 1978) (ruling that a lower court properly found
an attorney in contempt for substituting another person for his client at the defense table, but
finding the $500 fine excessive). In Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Rohrback, 591 A.2d
488, 498-99 (Md. Ct. App. 1991), a defense lawyer was suspended for forty-five days for
not informing a probation officer that his client had given a different name to avoid the
discovery of prior convictions likely to have resulted in the imposition of a term of
imprisonment rather than a suspended sentence. A particularly egregious impersonation
case is Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Raiford, 687 A.2d 1118, 1119-20 (Pa. 1997), in
which a lawyer was disbarred when he had someone impersonate one of his clients and
plead guilty to the possession of drugs found in a car owned by another of the lawyer’s
clients. The lawyer misled the impersonated client about the status of the charges so that the
client would not learn of the scheme. Id. at 1119. The defense lawyer was eventually
convicted of criminal charges for obstruction of justice, and, in upholding his disbarment,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that for a lawyer “[t]o engineer a criminal conviction
of his own client without her knowledge is so outrageously unethical as to require no further
comment.” Id. at 1120.
48. 251 F.3d 941 (11th Cir. 2001).
49. Id. at 943.
50. Id.
51. See 18 U.S.C. § 1515 (2002).
52. Kloess, 251 F.3d at 943.
53. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1515(c)).
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punish the providing of lawful, bona fide, legal representation services in
connection with or anticipation of an official proceeding.”54 In Kloess, the
Eleventh Circuit found that this provision “provides a complete defense to
the statute because one who is performing bona fide legal representation
does not have an improper purpose. His purpose, to zealously represent his
client, is fully protected by the law.”55
Section 1515(c) is consistent with the requirements of the ethics rules,
which recognize that defense lawyers in criminal cases can test the strength
of the government’s cases even when counsel believes the evidence is
sufficient to convict.56 This duty of zealous advocacy permits a defense
lawyer to seek to undermine the credibility of government witnesses,
regardless of whether their testimony is truthful, and to advance a defense
that the client is not guilty even if the lawyer knows that the defendant
committed the crime.57
A lawyer’s use of the legal system’s tools to assist a client can become
the basis for an obstruction of justice charge if the jury finds that the lawyer
crossed the line between legitimate advocacy and a corrupt purpose. In
United States v. Cueto,58 the Seventh Circuit upheld the conviction of a
lawyer for obstruction based in part on his filing for a restraining order
against an undercover informant. The government advanced a theory that
the lawyer sought to protect his personal financial interests in his client’s
illegal gambling business.59 The government argued that the litigationrelated conduct, while not illegal itself, was for the purpose of obstructing
the government’s criminal investigation of the client.60 In finding the
requisite intent to act corruptly, the Seventh Circuit stated, “As a lawyer,
[defendant] possessed a heightened awareness of the law and its scope, and
he cannot claim lack of fair notice as to what conduct is proscribed by
§ 1503 to shield himself from criminal liability, particularly when he was
already ‘bent on serious wrongdoing.’”61 While bona fide legal services
fall outside the scope of the obstruction of justice statute, the lawyer’s
54. 18 U.S.C. § 1515(c).
55. 251 F.3d at 948. The court held that once a defendant fairly raises a defense under
§ 1515(c), the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the conduct did not
constitute bona fide, lawful legal representation. Id. at 949.
56. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2002).
57. See MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS 213
(2d ed. 2002) (“Is it ever proper for a lawyer to cross-examine an adverse witness who has
testified accurately and truthfully in order to make the witness appear to be mistaken or
lying? Our answer is yes—but the same answer is also given by almost every other
commentator on lawyers’ ethics.”); CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 587
(1986) (“Once the lawyer undertakes the defense, he or she may not refuse to take steps on
behalf of the accused because of the lawyer’s belief in the guilt of the accused.”).
58. 151 F.3d 620 (7th Cir. 1998).
59. Id. at 627-28.
60. Id. at 626.
61. Id. at 631 (emphasis added).
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knowledge of the law and his client can be used to prove the corrupt intent
necessary to obviate any protection provided to the lawyer under §
1515(c).62 The responsibility of the lawyer to know the client and to
communicate regularly in the course of the representation may in fact be
the basis to demonstrate the intent to obstruct justice.
Moreover, Cueto and Kloess show the precarious position of the lawyer
whose legal representation of the client brings the lawyer in close
proximity to the client’s misconduct.63 Although a lawyer may believe that
his conduct is innocent, a lawyer may run afoul of the obstruction of justice
statute while assisting the client. In United States v. Kellington,64
Kellington, a civil lawyer, accommodated his client’s request to assist in
disposing of certain property, which landed him in the middle of an
obstruction of justice indictment.65 After arrest, the client, a fugitive from a
federal drug conviction who had been represented by Kellington in a civil
case under an assumed name, asked Kellington to remove certain items that
were hidden in his house.66 Complying with this request, Kellington, who
professed ignorance of the nature of the materials and the extent of his
client’s involvement in any misconduct, asked another person to destroy
items that appeared to be evidence of criminal conduct, including cash and

62. The intent requirement for an obstruction of justice charge under 18 U.S.C. § 1512
is subject to dispute as to what constitutes “corruptly.” A majority of courts employ the
“improper purpose” analysis of “corruptly,” requiring only that the government show that
the defendant acted with an improper purpose when engaged in the conduct alleged to have
obstructed justice but not requiring that the conduct be wrongful in itself. See United States
v. Arthur Andersen, 374 F.3d 271, 295 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Congress knew that courts had
uniformly defined ‘corruptly’ in 18 U.S.C. § 1503 as ‘motivated by an improper purpose,’
and it is logical to give the word ‘corruptly’ in § 1512 the same meaning that it has in §
1503.”); United States v. Schotts, 145 F.3d 1289, 1300 (11th Cir. 1998) (noting that the
language used in § 1512 has been interpreted as meaning with an “improper purpose”);
United States v. Thompson, 76 F.3d 442, 452 (2d Cir. 1996) (construing that the use of the
term “corrupt” in § 1512 requires that the government must prove that the defendant was
motivated by an “improper purpose”); United States v. Cintolo, 818 F.2d 980, 991 (1st Cir.
1987) (explaining that “§ 1503 criminalizes conduct which obstructs or impedes the due
administration of justice, provided such conduct is undertaken with a corrupt or improper
purpose”). The Third Circuit requires greater proof of intent than just an attempt to hinder
an investigation, stating that “an individual can ‘persuade’ another not to disclose
information to a law enforcement official with the intent of hindering an investigation
without violating the statute, i.e., without doing so ‘corruptly.’” United States v. Farrell,
126 F.3d 484, 489 (3d Cir. 1997). The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Arthur
Andersen case to review the meaning of “corruptly.” Arthur Andersen, LLP v. United
States, 125 S. Ct. 823 (2005).
63. See Bruce A. Green, The Criminal Regulation of Lawyers, 67 FORDHAM L. REV.
327, 386 (1998) (“[T]he very nature of this pursuit places lawyers at risk because they deal
more often than others with individuals who are themselves engaged in wrongdoing, and,
especially in the case of criminal defense lawyers, an aspect of the risk is that the lawyer’s
conduct or intentions may be misperceived.”).
64. 217 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2000).
65. Id. at 1088-89.
66. Id. at 1088.
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fake identity documents.67 The trial court refused to permit the jury to
consider whether Kellington acted in a manner consistent with the ethics
rules, which would establish a defense under 18 U.S.C. § 1515(c).68 The
Ninth Circuit held this decision in error because
Kellington was unable to frame and give content to the core of his
defense—that Kellington was attempting (however imprudently in
hindsight) to provide his client with bona fide legal representation, and
that much of the conduct from which the government would have the
jury infer criminal intent can be explained by his ethical obligations to
[his client] . . . .69

In Kellington, the lawyer professed ignorance of his client’s misconduct
and testified that he would not have complied with the request had he
known more about the client’s circumstances.70 What about the situation
where a lawyer defends a client whom the lawyer knows is guilty? Can the
lawyer create a false impression of the client’s innocence to win an
acquittal?
An ethics opinion issued by the State Bar of Michigan considered
whether a lawyer could call friends of the defendant as alibi witnesses to
testify that the defendant was with them at the time the victim stated the
robbery took place.71 The defense lawyer learned from his client that the
victim’s recollection of when the robbery took place was later than the time
when the crime actually occurred, due to the fact that the defendant had
rendered the victim unconscious before robbing him.72 The alibi witnesses
would testify truthfully that the defendant was with them at the time the
victim said the crime occurred, thus creating a false impression with the
court and the jury that the defendant had not committed the crime when, in
fact, he had.73 The State Bar of Michigan opined that “[t]he situation with
the friends as alibi witnesses in the instant case does not involve tampering
with evidence. One cannot suborn the truth.”74 Therefore, the defense
lawyer had a duty to call the witnesses because the requirement of zealous
representation of the client meant that “where truthful testimony will be
offered, it seems axiomatic that a defendant is entitled to the effective
assistance of counsel in presenting evidence, even though the defendant has
made inculpatory statements to his counsel.”75
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1099-1100.
69. Id. at 1101.
70. Id. at 1089.
71. Michigan Ethics Opinion CI-1164 (1987), available at http://www.michbar.
org/opinions/ethics/numbered_opinions/ci-1164.html.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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If a lawyer can create a false impression with the judge and jury, is that a
deception that could violate a criminal law? While the State Bar of
Michigan urged the lawyer to call the witnesses, in contrast, the state of
Minnesota has a statute that may prohibit such conduct.76 The statute
provides, “Every attorney or counselor at law who shall be guilty of deceit
or collusion . . . with intent to deceive the court or any party . . . shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor.”77 In State v. Casby,78 the Minnesota Supreme
Court upheld the conviction of a lawyer for violating the statute by not
informing the court that her client gave his brother’s name when arrested
for speeding and littering and then when pleading guilty to the charges.79
The court stated that “the client was embarked on a course of continuing
deceit. The sixth amendment does not expect an attorney to assist a client
in furthering fraud on the court.”80
If the defense lawyer’s ethical obligation is to take advantage of any
weakness in the government’s case, even if it requires the lawyer to create
a false impression with the jury about the defendant’s innocence, then the
defense lawyer is indeed more than just a minor hindrance in the criminal
process, but a veritable obstruction to obtaining a conviction. From the
prosecutor’s point of view, the defense lawyer is something more than an
embodiment of the constitutional right to the assistance of counsel when
that assistance can obfuscate rather than illuminate the truth. But it is not
an obstruction of justice when the system depends on the defense lawyer,
who protects the client by attempting, within the confines of the ethical
rules, to obtain a result that may be contradictory to the defendant’s guilt.
The defense lawyer is not a fate worse than death for the prosecution but a
necessary component of the criminal justice system. The fact that some
defense lawyers may cross the line into improper conduct does not mean
that lawyers as a rule obstruct justice or otherwise act improperly.
II. TARGETING LAWYERS
The fact that lawyers are prosecuted for crimes is nothing new. Lawyers
have been prosecuted for embezzlement of client trust funds,81 insider
trading, and the use of confidential information for their own personal
76. 2004 MINN. LAWS § 481.071.
77. Id.
78. 348 N.W.2d 736 (Minn. 1984).
79. Id. at 738-39.
80. Id. at 739. Casby received a public reprimand and two years supervised probation
for her conduct. See In re Application for the Discipline of Camelia J. Casby, 355 N.W.2d
704, 705 (Minn. 1984).
81. See, e.g., In re Ford, 44 Cal. 3d 810 (1988) (disbarring an attorney due to his
admitted misappropriation of client funds held in trust); In re Lyons, 15 Cal. 3d 322 (1975)
(ordering that an attorney be disbarred as a result of misappropriation of funds entrusted to
the attorney).
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benefit.82 These are clear abuses of lawyers’ positions of trust. In recent
years, prosecutions of lawyers have occurred for money laundering related
to the payment of legal fees83 and for providing money generated by drug
sales to arrested drug cartel couriers to maintain their silence and to avoid
the implication of the cartel’s leader.84 In United States v. Gellene,85 the
government successfully prosecuted a prominent New York City
bankruptcy lawyer from a distinguished law firm for bankruptcy fraud.
The government prosecuted him because of his failure to fully disclose his
representation of other claimants in the bankruptcy proceeding, even
though the government never alleged that his legal work was affected by
the undisclosed conflicts.86 What is rather unnerving is that, throughout
these criminal investigations, prosecutors have used lawyers as sources of
information about the wrongdoing of their clients.87
If lawyers are untrustworthy when they represent clients in criminal
investigations, then does it follow that they engage in criminal conduct,
constituting assistance in criminal schemes, when they provide legal advice

82. See, e.g., United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 647 (1997) (upholding the
conviction of a lawyer who used confidential information from a client when considering a
hostile takeover to purchase securities of the target corporation); United States v. ReBrook,
837 F. Supp. 162, 171 (S.D. W. Va. 1993) (finding that a lawyer charged with insider
trading and mail fraud for using confidential information from a client to purchase shares in
companies owed a duty to the public and to his employer not to improperly use such
information), rev’d, 58 F.3d 961 (4th Cir. 1995); SEC v. Singer, 786 F. Supp. 1158, 1168-69
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (hearing the SEC’s argument that a lawyer traded securities of a company
based upon information received from a corporate director about a possible leveraged buyout).
83. See United States v. Tarkoff, 242 F.3d 991 (11th Cir. 2001) (convicting defense
lawyers for money laundering in a case involving transfers of funds from a client’s United
States account, comprised of proceeds from Medicare fraud, through a financial institution
in Curaçao to accounts in Israel).
84. See United States v. Abbell, 271 F.3d 1286, 1297 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he evidence
supported a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt that, to the extent Rodriguez-Orejuela
had other business interests, Abbell knew that those business interests were so intertwined
with Rodriguez-Orejuela’s narcotics trafficking that money paid by Rodriguez-Orejuela
came, at a minimum, from commingled funds.”).
85. 182 F.3d 578 (7th Cir. 1999).
86. Id. at 588 (“We have no doubt that a misstatement in a Rule 2014 [disclosure]
statement by an attorney about other affiliations constitutes a material misstatement. . . .
This requirement goes to the heart of the integrity of the administration of the bankruptcy
estate.”).
87. See, e.g., United States v. White, 970 F.2d 328 (7th Cir. 1992) (discussing the
government’s obtainment of documents from a lawyer who had been convicted of
bankruptcy fraud and who decided to cooperate with a government investigation by
providing information about another client investigated in a separate bankruptcy fraud);
United States v. Ofshe, 817 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir. 1987) (affirming the admission of evidence
gained by the use of a listening device by a lawyer who was a target of a corruption
investigation and who agreed to wear a listening device in meetings with his client regarding
possible drug transactions); cf. United States v. Knoll, 16 F.3d 1313 (2d Cir. 1994)
(remanding the case for an evidentiary hearing concerning whether the theft of documents
from a lawyer’s office used to convict that lawyer for aiding bankruptcy fraud was under the
direction of a government agent).
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in everyday business transactions? Lawyers are much more involved in
advising clients about how to conduct their business than ever before due to
the pervasiveness of the regulation of economic activity.88 When the
lawyer moves from the courtroom to the boardroom, the possibility of a
lawyer becoming enmeshed in questionable conduct increases
substantially.
Many prosecutions of lawyers stem from their conduct in a personal
capacity or from their dealings with a court. In recent years, however,
there has been a substantial increase in the number of criminal prosecutions
of lawyers based on their legal advice to businesses—far removed from the
courtroom and the representation of criminal defendants.
As the
government targets lawyers for how they practice their profession, the
question arises as to whether the government views legal advice as another
form of criminality in much the same way that a conspiratorial agreement
is subject to prosecution.
The First Circuit’s decision in United States v. Cintolo89 highlights the
view that legal representation is simply another form of potential
misconduct. In Cintolo, the defendant-lawyer represented a witness in a
grand jury investigation of racketeering while he acted at the direction of
the criminal organization leader, who used Cintolo to ensure that the
witnesses did not testify.90 Cintolo counseled his “client” to assert the Fifth
Amendment and, when granted immunity, to refuse to testify and to suffer
a contempt charge.91 Unknown to the participants in the scheme, the
government taped conversations regarding Cintolo’s representation, which
made it clear that Cintolo was not working in his client’s best interest.92
Cintolo was convicted of conspiracy to obstruct justice.93 On appeal, he
argued that he did not have the requisite “corrupt” intent because the legal
advice was not itself criminal.94 He also argued that the jury should be
instructed that a legitimate explanation by a lawyer for his conduct in
advising a client cannot obstruct justice.95 The First Circuit rejected the
88. See Richard W. Painter, The Moral Interdependence of Corporate Lawyers and
Their Clients, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 507, 525 (1994) (“Today, corporations depend more than
ever on lawyers to advise management and to lobby government concerning regulation. Just
as the creation of railroads and a banking system in the nineteenth century was a legal as
well as a business enterprise, legal risks in many of today's highly regulated industries like
banking, insurance, airlines, and waste management have become business risks. Even
apart from industry-specific regulation, regulation of almost every aspect of economic life
such as the environment, health and safety, employment, and securities ensures that legal
and business components of corporate decisions are often intertwined.”).
89. 818 F.2d 980 (1st Cir. 1987).
90. Id. at 984.
91. Id. at 984-87.
92. Id. at 984-88.
93. Id. at 992, 1005.
94. Id. at 990.
95. Id.
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arguments because “the acceptance of a retainer by a lawyer in a criminal
case cannot become functionally equivalent to the lawyer’s acceptance of a
roving commission to flout the criminal law with impunity.”96
While the court was correct that a lawyer could obstruct justice by
advising a client, Cintolo denigrated the nature of legal advice as being
different from other types of criminal conduct. The court noted that giving
a person a ride to the airport or buying a chisel from a hardware store is not
illegal unless it is a part of a larger scheme to engage in misconduct,
thereby converting legal acts into illegal conduct.97 According to the First
Circuit, legal advice is just the same: “In the most fundamental sense, the
‘advice’ given by Cintolo in the manipulation of his own client was a
commodity no different than the chisel or the free ride. It was legal to
traffic in the wares, but illegal corruptly to put them to felonious use.”98
However, legal advice is not a “ware” fetched off a shelf or a fungible
commodity available for the taking by paying the going rate. The First
Circuit misapprehended the nature of legal advice, which is designed to
assist a client to adhere to the law. Unlike the chisel or free ride, legal
advice involves the very possibility that the conduct at issue will be illegal;
otherwise, there would be no need to consult a lawyer. When legal advice
is provided to a client accused of a crime, the role of the criminal defense
lawyer is, at least in part, to frustrate the system to ensure that only the
guilty are convicted of a crime. The lawyer may ethically obstruct the
criminal justice system by seeking an acquittal of a client, even a guilty
one. In a business setting, the lines are less clear because the legal advice
is prospective and ostensibly designed to avoid a violation rather than how
to deal with the consequences of one.
The conviction of Cintolo is certainly justifiable because lawyers can
cross the line from giving proper legal advice to misusing the tools of the
criminal justice system to defeat its very purpose.99 Under the obstruction
of justice statute, it is doubtful Cintolo provided bona fide, legal
representation services when he sought to shield one person’s criminality
by manipulating his client. To call his conduct ethical would be an
absurdity. Yet, the view that legal advice is simply a commodity that can
be misused as easily as any other physical device to commit a crime
denigrates the importance of the lawyer in the criminal justice system. If
legal advice is merely another tool to be misused, then lawyers are as guilty
as any other person when they defend clients by seeking to avoid their
96. Id.
97. Id. at 993.
98. Id.
99. See United States v. Cueto, 151 F.3d 620, 632 (7th Cir. 1998) (reasoning that the
adversarial system, and its goal of seeking justice, would be undermined if lawyers were not
reprimanded for criminal and manipulative conduct).
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conviction.
If legal advice is essentially fungible, then targeting lawyers for
prosecution is a short step to take in expanding the scope of the criminal
law. Under this view, the presence of the lawyer is another sign of
criminality, and so, prosecutors can regard the lawyer as criminally liable
for giving legal advice that does not prevent others from engaging in
misconduct. It is this gatekeeper role of lawyers advising businesses that
makes legal advice particularly vulnerable to a charge of assisting a client’s
fraud because the lawyer’s role may be so close to the misconduct that
prosecutors consider them facilitators of the crime. For example, in United
States v. Anderson,100 the government brought a large-scale Medicare fraud
indictment that included two lawyers in addition to the doctors and hospital
administrators charged with an array of fraud and conspiracy offenses.101
The lawyers represented several hospitals in trying to create a legal means
of compensating two doctors who referred a large number of patients from
nursing homes to the hospitals.102 The government alleged that the
lawyers, together with the other defendants whose activities were more
directly involved in the misconduct, sought to erect a system to provide
kickbacks to the doctors by disguising illegal referral fees as consulting
arrangements.103
Throughout the negotiation process, the lawyers sought to effectuate a
business arrangement between the hospitals and the doctors in a legal
manner while operating in an area whose rules are arcane and subject to
frequent, and often confusing, changes.104 In dismissing the charges
against the lawyers, the trial judge stated:
It is undisputed from the evidence that all the lawyers who dealt with or
reviewed these transactions . . . held good faith beliefs that it was
possible to facilitate some business relationship between the hospitals
and [the doctors] . . . . [T]he reversals of field by the OIG [Office of
Inspector General, United States Department of Health and Human
Services] concerning its own interpretation, the checkered history of the
Hanlester [Network v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 1390 (9th Cir. 1995)] case and
the reservation by Congress of a safe harbor provision in the act (the
promulgation of regulations concerning which were delayed for a
considerable time) all invite lawyers to attempt to devise legal ways for
parties to have a relationship which has as a component hoped-for and
anticipated referrals . . . .

100. 85 F. Supp. 2d 1047 (D. Kan. 1999), rev’d by United States v. McClatchey, 217
F.3d 823 (10th Cir. 2000).
101. Id. at 1051.
102. Id. at 1055-56.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1060.
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There were no decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court or from the
Eighth or Tenth Circuits, where the activities in question were going on,
to guide them. What the evidence unassailably demonstrated is that [the
lawyers] steadfastly maintained to their clients that if fair market value
were paid for the doctors’ practice or for legitimate consulting services,
the relationship passed legal scrutiny. Nothing in the evidence or the law
suggests otherwise.105

The lawyers prosecuted in Anderson were trying to craft a legal solution
for their client to achieve a legitimate business purpose. The fact that they
were in an area heavily regulated by the government, and that they
provided advice regarding conduct that, if done improperly, could have
resulted in criminal prosecution, put the lawyers at risk of being labeled as
co-conspirators and participants in a scheme to defraud—even though their
legal work sought to avoid such an appellation.
One of the usual accouterments of fraud is that there is an illegal benefit
derived from the misstatements or omissions used to deceive the victims
and that the benefit usually comes from the victim, although not always.106
When the lawyer’s services are part of the scheme, a special payment or
benefit to the lawyer will be a hallmark of the lawyer’s participation in the
misconduct, in addition to the provided legal advice, whatever its
considered worth.107 The mail fraud statute,108 however, has been applied
to ethical breaches that deprive a client of the lawyer’s undivided loyalty in
representation, even where a lawyer does not gain any special benefit.
In United States v. Bronston,109 the government charged a lawyer, who
was also a state senator, with mail fraud for secretly representing a
company seeking a city bus shelter contract when his firm already
represented a competitor seeking the same contract.110 The lawyer’s breach
of the duty of loyalty owed to his firm’s client constituted fraud.111 The
Second Circuit found itself “faced with a straight-forward economic fraud
in which the object of the scheme was not merely to deprive the victims of
a law firm’s undivided loyalty, for which they paid $52,000, but to deprive

105. Id. at 1064-65.
106. Stephen Fraidin & Laura B. Mutterperl, Advice for Lawyers: Navigating the New
Realm of Federal Regulation of Legal Ethics, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 609, 615 (2003) (noting
that lawyers have been prosecuted for their involvement in fraudulent schemes, insider
trading, and market manipulation).
107. See Sylvia E. Stevens, A Fine Line: When Does Giving Legal Advice Become
Assisting a Client with Fraud?, 63 OR. ST. B. BULL. 29, 30-32 (listing and describing a
number of cases in which lawyers were found to have assisted their clients in the
perpetration of a fraud).
108. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2002).
109. 658 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1981).
110. Id. at 922-26.
111. Id. at 922.
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[the client] and its minority investors of the [client’s] franchise.”112 In
criticizing the decision, Professor John Coffee argued that,
[H]owever rare the Bronston facts may seem, conflicts of interest are as
inevitable as death and taxes. Current law appears to be approaching the
point of criminalizing a conflict of interest whenever the fiduciary
knowingly fails to disclose its existence and thereby deprives his
beneficiary of his “honest and faithful services.”113

Bronston’s actions likely deprived the firm’s client of the right of honest
services, at least to the extent that it could count on the lawyers in the firm
to refrain from helping a competitor. Now, this type of intangible harm—
the deprivation to the right of honest services—comes specifically within
the scope of the mail fraud statute: a lawyer’s ethical violation could be a
basis for bringing criminal charges, although the client must suffer some
harm from the breach of duty.114 Because lawyers act as fiduciaries for
their clients, the extent to which a lawyer acts unethically by not providing
loyal service to a client could be seen as a scheme to defraud, at least when
there is some improper benefit to the lawyer or economic loss to the client
from the ethical breach.115
If the ethics rules can form the basis of a criminal prosecution, then the

112. Id. at 929-30.
113. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Metastasis of Mail Fraud: The Continuing Story of the
“Evolution” of a White-Collar Crime, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 13 (1983). In United States
v. Gellene, 182 F.3d 578 (7th Cir. 1999), a bankruptcy lawyer’s failure to disclose to the
court that he had represented other parties with claims against the bankrupt company
resulted in a conviction for bankruptcy fraud. Like Bronston, there was no evidence of an
economic harm to the client, but unlike Bronston, the lawyer misled the court in connection
with being appointed as counsel for the bankrupt company. Id. at 587-88. While both cases
involved a conflict of interest, the real lesson of Gellene is that lawyers who actively
mislead a court will be convicted, regardless of whether there is any direct economic harm.
In United States v. Drury, 687 F.2d 63 (5th Cir. 1982), the Fifth Circuit upheld a lawyer’s
conviction of mail fraud for not disclosing to his clients that he received a fifteen percent
kickback of the medical fees from a physician to whom the lawyer referred his personal
injury clients. The court found that the lawyer breached his fiduciary duty to his clients by
concealing the financial arrangements with the physician “and consequently and
surreptitiously pocket[ing] a larger fee than that he had agreed on with the client.” Id. at 65.
Unlike Bronston, the lawyer used his clients to enrich himself, not necessarily at their
expense, but certainly without regard to their interest in paying the lowest fee possible for
legal representation.
114. See 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2002) (“For the purposes of this chapter, the term ‘scheme or
artifice to defraud’ includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of
honest services.”).
115. See Ellsworth A. Van Graafeiland, The Proposed Model Rules of Professional
Conduct and the Mail Fraud Statute, 48 BROOK. L. REV. 653, 659 (1982) (“If the local
leader of a political party, who is not a public officeholder, can be convicted of mail fraud
for depriving citizens of their right to honest government, no major conceptual leap is
required to argue that a lawyer who deprives the public of its right to the honest
administration of justice should also be held liable. If the provisions of the proposed Model
Rules do tilt toward a concern for society at large, an issue that will not be debated here,
intentional violations of rules such as Rule 3.3 may well support future charges of mail
fraud.”).
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next step may be the pursuit of lawyers for their representation of clients
that, while not unethical, fails to prevent misconduct. A recent indictment
of a lawyer for his representation of a corporate client by the Department of
Justice may indicate this expansion of the scope of potential criminal
liability for lawyers. In United States v. Munson,116 the government
indicted the executives of an energy trading subsidiary of a utility company
along with Munson, the corporation’s outside counsel, for securities and
mail fraud for submitting false financial statements.117 The indictment
alleged that Munson helped the executives “pump up” the company’s
earnings by “stretching fiscal recognition of a $1.25 million settlement”
over two fiscal years, thereby lowering the company’s expenses and
increasing its earnings.118 Munson represented the subsidiary in the
settlement, but the indictment does not discuss how his legal representation
related to the fraudulent accounting of the settlement.119 Moreover, while
the executives received bonuses based on meeting certain financial goals,
the indictment alleges only that Munson “sought to please a client . . . from
whom he hoped to obtain additional legal business and eventual
employment,” including being appointed as general counsel for the
subsidiary.120
The case is still in the pre-trial phase, and so, the government has not yet
brought forth its proof. The indictment, however, contains no allegation
that Munson’s legal advice to the corporate client was relevant to the
accounting treatment of the expense, nor does it contain an allegation that
he breached any fiduciary obligation to the client.121 Moreover, his gain
from the fraudulent scheme, unlike the monetary benefits reaped by the
company’s executives, consists of the vague “hope[] to obtain additional
legal business” and perhaps being hired as the client’s in-house counsel.122
It is axiomatic that lawyers seek to continue their representation of clients,
either in the current matter or in future legal issues. Indeed, one of the
benefits of retaining a lawyer on a long-term basis is the cost-savings for
clients who then have a lawyer familiar with their legal needs and who
establishes a good working relationship with the officers and managers of
116. No. 03 CR 1153, 03 CR 1154, 2004 WL 1672880 (N.D. Ill. July 28, 2004).
117. See id. at *1 (outlining Munson’s manipulation of the company’s earnings
statements to make it appear more profitable than it truly was by violating accepted
accounting principles when structuring the payment of a $1.25 million dollar settlement to
another utility company).
118. Id.
119. See United States v. Stoffer, No. 03CR1153, 2003 WL 23145605 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 10,
2003) (focusing on how Munson worked with executives in an attempt to make the
company appear more profitable through accounting principles as opposed to examining the
impact Munson’s legal advice had on the company).
120. Id. at ¶¶ 1.f, 3.
121. See generally Stoffer, 2003 WL 23145605.
122. Id. at ¶¶ 1.f, 3.
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the company interacting with the lawyer on a regular basis.
There is nothing wrong with “hoping” for future legal business, as long
as the lawyer provides competent representation and maintains the requisite
independence from the client. Tellingly, the indictment of Munson does
not make any reference to his shaping legal advice to curry favor with the
client or his using information from the representation to favor his own
position to the detriment of the client, which would be a breach of his
ethical duties.123 Unlike Bronston, in which the lawyer’s ethical breach can
be viewed as having harmed the client’s interest by helping a competitor, in
this case, the government appears to have indicted the lawyer because he
did not prevent the wrongdoing from occurring. In this sense, the lawyer’s
failure to undertake a gatekeeper role, rather than any specific problem
with the legal advice offered to the client, appears to be the criminal
conduct. It may be that Munson conspired with the other executives to
mislead the parent corporation or altered documents to conceal the
fraudulent accounting, but the indictment contains no indication that such
events occurred. Instead, it appears that the lawyer was not charged for
misconduct in his role as counsel to the company, but rather, was charged
with being at the scene of the crime and not doing anything to stop it,
apparently with the “hope” of gaining future business.
III. TARGETING LEGAL ADVICE
Lawyers can be held accountable for the legal advice that they provide to
clients in a number of ways. Malpractice suits provide clients with a means
of redress when the lawyer was negligent in the representation. Similarly,
even if the lawyer was not negligent, a breach of fiduciary duty can result
in an award of damages or a return of the legal fees. Each state maintains
an extensive disciplinary apparatus for reviewing complaints against
lawyers and can impose sanctions against lawyers ranging from private
admonitions to suspensions and even disbarment for serious misconduct.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act,124 adopted in 2002 in the wake of spectacular
corporate failures involving large corporations like Enron and Worldcom,
empowered the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) to impose
an ethical obligation on lawyers of publicly-traded corporations to report
wrongdoing within the corporation to senior management and to the board
of directors.125 Judges have not hesitated to hold lawyers in contempt for
123. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(b) (2002) (“A lawyer shall not use
information relating to representation of a client to the disadvantage of the client unless the
client gives informed consent . . . .”).
124. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 11
U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 29 U.S.C.).
125. See 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (Supp. 2004). Section 7245 provides:
Not later than 180 days after July 30, 2002, the Commission shall issue rules, in the
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misconduct during litigation, and lawyers are not shy about complaining
about the conduct of opposing counsel by seeking disqualification.
While the effectiveness of these means to redress wrongdoing by
lawyers is open to question, the profession does not operate without
oversight by both administrative bodies and the judiciary. As prosecutors
use the criminal law with greater frequency to pursue charges against
lawyers for conduct that would have been the subject of a disciplinary or
malpractice action in an earlier time, the issue becomes one of the
appropriateness of the regulation of lawyers through the criminal process.
As Professor Bruce Green notes, “The criminal law’s regulatory role is
most interesting, and potentially troubling, in situations where the criminal
law points lawyers in one direction but other professional norms, such as
those embodied in the lawyer codes, appear to point lawyers in the opposite
direction.”126
The issue now has expanded into whether legal advice has become an
obstruction to criminal investigations and prosecutions such that the mere
presence of a lawyer is indicia of guilt and a sign that the person is not
cooperating with the government. The SEC’s Director of Enforcement,
Stephen Cutler, stated in a speech:
One area of particular focus for us is the role of lawyers in internal
investigations of their clients or companies. We are concerned that, in
some instances, lawyers may have conducted investigations in such a
manner as to help hide ongoing fraud, or may have taken actions to
actively obstruct such investigations.127

A lawyer who orders the destruction of documents or removal of
electronic files from a server to keep them from the government would
clearly be guilty of obstruction of justice. Now, however, internal
investigations are standard whenever there is even a hint of impropriety at a
public interest and for the protection of investors, setting forth minimum standards
of professional conduct for attorneys appearing and practicing before the
Commission in any way in the representation of issuers, including a rule—
(1) requiring an attorney to report evidence of a material violation of securities law
or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation by the company or any agent
thereof, to the chief legal counsel or the chief executive officer of the company (or
the equivalent thereof); and
(2) if the counsel or officer does not appropriately respond to the evidence
(adopting, as necessary, appropriate remedial measures or sanctions with respect to
the violation), requiring the attorney to report the evidence to the audit committee
of the board of directors of the issuer or to another committee of the board of
directors comprised solely of directors not employed directly or indirectly by the
issuer, or to the board of directors.
126. Green, supra note 63, at 391-92.
127. Stephen M. Cutler, The Themes of Sarbanes-Oxley as Reflected in the
Commission’s Enforcement Program, Speech at the UCLA School of Law (Sept. 20, 2004),
at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch092004smc.htm (on file with the American
University Law Review).

10/3/2005 1:35 PM

HENNING

2005]

TARGETING LEGAL ADVICE

693

corporation. In such a situation, the lawyer’s advice to the company and its
employees could be to not respond to the government’s request for
interviews and to assert the Fifth Amendment privilege until corporate
counsel completes an investigation. Would that directive obstruct an
investigation?
While the destruction of documents is surely criminal, Mr. Cutler’s
statement may include more than what is prohibited already by criminal
law because one would certainly hope that the SEC is vigilant regarding
such flagrant misconduct. The question is whether legal advice, given to a
corporation to not cooperate with the government and to resist a subpoena
for records, or advice given to individual employees that they can assert
their Fifth Amendment rights would be “obstruction” in the eyes of the
SEC. There is nothing illegal about this advice, but once again, the
lawyer’s involvement may be viewed as inherently suspect, at least until
the company agrees to cooperate fully. If there is a suspicion that lawyers
act to obstruct justice without violating the ethical rules—indeed, when
acting ethically—then the results of an internal investigation will not be
trustworthy because it was tainted by a lawyer seeking to protect the
corporate client who conducted the review.
The Thompson Memorandum takes that suspicion of lawyers to a higher
level by making waivers of the attorney-client privilege and the work
product protection a strong indicia of cooperation.128 It has the following
as a general principle:
In determining whether to charge a corporation, that corporation’s timely
and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate
with the government’s investigation may be relevant factors. In gauging
the extent of the corporation’s cooperation, the prosecutor may consider
the corporation’s willingness to identify the culprits within the
corporation, including senior executives; to make witnesses available; to
disclose the complete results of its internal investigation; and to waive
attorney-client and work product protection.129

The DOJ explains that waivers assist its investigations because they
“permit the government to obtain statements of possible witnesses,
subjects, and targets, without having to negotiate individual cooperation or
immunity agreements.”130 Those are the very agreements that lawyers for
individuals would extract from the government as the price for the
cooperation of an officer or employee. By having the corporation conduct
at least the first phase of the investigation, the government can obtain
statements that a lawyer would otherwise advise a client not to make
128. See Thompson Memorandum, supra note 14, at VI.A.
129. Id.
130. Id. at VI.B.
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without the protection of an immunity agreement or plea bargain.
Some have criticized the “waiver” as hardly voluntary because of the
coercive effect of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines131 and the ease with
which a corporation can be proven guilty under the principle of respondeat
superior.132 A Comment to the Thompson Memorandum states that the
DOJ “does not, however, consider waiver of a corporation’s attorney-client
and work product protection an absolute requirement.”133 However, this
provides cold comfort to corporate counsel assessing whether to waive the
protections afforded to lawyers conducting internal investigations, because
the determination of whether a corporation has sufficiently cooperated is
completely within the DOJ’s discretion.134 Moreover, corporate counsel
have questioned whether they will receive complete cooperation from
employees if it is known that what is said or provided in the internal
investigation will be turned over to the government and, in all likelihood, to
private litigants.
The government simply is not lazy by seeking the waiver to obtain the
complete results of the internal investigation. It is, instead, symptomatic of
the DOJ’s mistrust of lawyers, who can use the shield of the attorney-client
privilege and the work product protection to safeguard the content of their
internal investigation and, potentially, make it more difficult for the
government to fully investigate corporate misconduct. If lawyers tell their
clients not to cooperate with the government without some protection—
either a grant of immunity or a plea agreement—then perhaps the
corporation will obtain the statements that will spare the government from
having to pay the price for such cooperation. However, it is unlikely that
the government will accept the conclusions of an internal investigation
uncritically or forego its own investigation simply because the
131. See Lance Cole, Revoking Our Privileges: Federal Law Enforcement’s Multi-Front
Assault on the Attorney-Client Privilege (and Why It Is Misguided), 48 VILL. L. REV. 469,
537-38 (2002) (claiming that the Corporate Sentencing Guidelines pressure companies to
cooperate with the government to receive a lower culpability score); see also U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, app. § 8C2.5(g) (2003) (outlining the mitigating effect
of a corporation’s self-reporting, cooperation, and acceptance of responsibility). But see
Mary Beth Buchanan, Effective Cooperation by Business Organizations and the Impact of
Privilege Waivers, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 587, 608 (2004) (noting that Application Note
12 to § 8C2.5 was recently amended to clarify that a waiver is not always a prerequisite to a
lower culpability score).
132. See Cole, supra note 131, at 543 (arguing that allowing prosecutors to consider a
corporation’s willingness to waive the attorney-client privilege and the work product
protection “go[es] quite far toward effectively forcing a corporation to waive privilege
protections if it hopes to obtain favorable charging treatment at the hands of DOJ
prosecutors”).
133. Thompson Memorandum, supra note 14, at VI.B.
134. But see Buchanan, supra note 131, at 597 (“[C]laims that the sanctity of the
attorney-client privilege is being undermined by the Department’s assessment of
cooperation by organizational defendants are greatly overstated. In any case, the decision to
waive the privilege must be made by the corporation.”).
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corporation’s lawyers have already conducted one. Nonetheless, the
waiver gives prosecutors some assurance that they have not missed
anything protected by the attorney-client privilege or the work product
protection. It allows them to consider charges without having to make
deals with officers or employees to obtain information.
This fear of legal advice is further shown by a Comment to the
Thompson Memorandum where the DOJ identifies conduct that can
demonstrate a lack of cooperation from an organization that “appears to be
protecting its culpable employees and agents:”
[A] corporation’s promise of support to culpable employees and agents,
either through the advancing of attorneys fees, through retaining the
employees without sanction for their misconduct, or through providing
information to the employees about the government’s investigation
pursuant to a joint defense agreement, may be considered by the
prosecutor in weighing the extent and value of a corporation’s
cooperation.135

The Comment contains a footnote acknowledging that some states
require the payment of attorney’s fees and that “a corporation’s compliance
with governing law should not be considered a failure to cooperate.”136
What the footnote does not address is whether a contractual obligation to
provide attorney’s fees that is authorized, but not compelled, by a state’s
corporate law, would be considered inappropriate support.137
Ethics rules require that a lawyer may not represent multiple clients
when a potential conflict of interest between their positions exists, or if the
lawyer’s representation of one client would limit the representation of a
second.138 An investigation of a corporation and its officers and employees
135. Thompson Memorandum, supra note 14, at VI.B.
136. Id. at VI.B n.4.
137. For example, Delaware law allows a corporation to enter into agreements for the
payment of expenses beyond what is required by its law. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(f)
(2001). Another provision permits a corporation to advance the attorney’s fees of an officer
or director in a criminal investigation or prosecution “upon receipt of an undertaking by or
on behalf of such director or officer to repay such amount if it shall ultimately be
determined that such person is not entitled” to receive attorney’s fees from the company. Id.
§ 145(e). Would a contract or by-law provision requiring the advancement of attorney’s
fees to an officer show that the corporation is not cooperating with the government?
138. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b) (2002). It provides:
Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest . . ., a lawyer may
represent a client if:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide
competent and diligent representation to each affected client;
(2) the representation is not prohibited by law;
(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client against
another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding
before a tribunal; and
(4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.
Id.
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will almost certainly require that each individual be represented by separate
counsel, especially if the government plans to seek the cooperation of one
or more of the investigative targets to testify against the others. Payment of
the attorney’s fees of an officer or employee during an investigation may
well be in the corporation’s best interest because its own culpability will be
based on the conduct of the officers. The presence of the lawyers will,
however, frustrate the government’s investigation, which the Thompson
Memorandum views as a basis for seeking to have the corporation waive its
privileges.139
By discouraging corporations from paying for separate counsel, the
government uses the ethical prohibition on conflicts of interest to obtain
information from individuals that it might not otherwise be able to get.
Counsel for the corporation cannot give legal advice to individual officers
without running afoul of the conflict rules, and, if paying for a separate
lawyer will be a sign of non-cooperation, the corporation is unlikely to
suggest that the employee obtain his or her own lawyer before cooperating
in the investigation, lest it appear to be shielding the employee. This puts
corporate counsel in a precarious position under the ethics rules if the
employee thinks the lawyer represents the individual, and the lawyer fails
to correct that misperception.140
If the government requires corporate counsel to ensure that individuals
cooperate with internal investigations as a condition to finding that the
corporation itself cooperated, then the Thompson Memorandum seeks to
take advantage of an individual’s lack of knowledge and willingness to
help an employer. Proof of corporate cooperation may be contingent on
showing that no lawyers other than the corporation’s were present and that
all privilege and work product claims can be waived. This approach views
lawyers, who are not subject to the government’s coercive power over the
corporation, as likely to frustrate investigations. Therefore, they must not
be present if the government wishes to accomplish its goal.
The premise of the DOJ’s view that the payment of attorney’s fees
signals a lack of cooperation is that the corporation may be shielding a
“culpable” employee.141 Apparently, providing a lawyer to a person who is
guilty seems to be sure indicia of an uncooperative organization. The
139. See generally Thompson Memorandum, supra note 14, at VI.A.
140. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(d) (2002) (“In dealing with an
organization’s directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other constituents, a
lawyer shall explain the identity of the client when the lawyer knows or reasonably should
know that the organization’s interests are adverse to those of the constituents with whom the
lawyer is dealing.”); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.3 (2002) (“When a lawyer
knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresented person misunderstands the
lawyer’s role in the matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the
misunderstanding.”).
141. See Thompson Memorandum, supra note 14, at VI.B.
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problem is that “culpable” is not defined anywhere, and surely it cannot
mean “guilty” because there has not been any adjudication of criminal
liability at the point when the DOJ considers whether to charge the
corporation with a crime. The Thompson Memorandum seems to include
any person who the government believes engaged in wrongdoing as
“culpable,” and therefore, not worthy of receiving any benefit from the
corporation, regardless of the phase of the investigation.
An inquiry into possible corporate misconduct occurs before, not after,
charges are filed because it is not clear whether a crime occurred. Any
determination of culpability, therefore, must wait at least until the
government has probable cause that a person committed an offense and
files an indictment. Yet, the Thompson Memorandum treats virtually any
employee who might be involved in misconduct as culpable well before the
investigation is complete. This turns the presumption of innocence on its
head because a corporation that does not immediately turn on a potentially
culpable employee has not cooperated and may suffer an indictment itself.
The government’s suspicion of the corporation’s cooperative spirit is
further heightened if there is a joint defense agreement. Generally, courts
have been supportive of these types of agreements as a means to share
information among those with a common interest to facilitate their legal
defense without risking the complete loss of the attorney-client privilege.142
Yet, the Thompson Memorandum views these agreements as a sign that the
corporation is not cooperative in the government’s investigation.143 The
internal investigation becomes much more difficult if conducted in an
atmosphere of distrust, yet the government seeks to take advantage of the
corporation’s presumed authority over its employees to obtain statements it
might otherwise be unable to access.144
A joint defense agreement allows lawyers for individuals to monitor the
investigation and makes it easier to formulate a common defense, thereby
making the government’s investigation more difficult. Like the payment of
attorney’s fees, the joint defense agreement enhances the ability of the
lawyer to defend the client, and therefore, is something the DOJ views with
great suspicion.
The rationale for the Thompson Memorandum is that “[t]oo often
142. See United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 243 (2d Cir. 1989) (“The joint
defense privilege, more properly identified as the ‘common interest rule,’ . . . has been
described as ‘an extension of the attorney client privilege,’ . . . . It serves to protect the
confidentiality of communications passing from one party to the attorney for another party
where a joint defense effort or strategy has been decided upon and undertaken by the parties
and their respective counsel.”).
143. See Thompson Memorandum, supra note 14, at VI.
144. See Finder, supra note 19, at 112 (remarking that a company facing an internal
investigation now considers it problematic for relationships among employees,
management, and the board of directors).
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business organizations, while purporting to cooperate with a Department
investigation, in fact take steps to impede the quick and effective exposure
of the complete scope of wrongdoing under investigation.”145 This
presupposes, of course, that criminal conduct has taken place and that the
corporation and its employees are responsible, so that the only issue for the
government is to identify the culprits and bring them to justice.
Corporations certainly commit crimes, but it is not always immediately
apparent that criminal conduct has taken place at the start of an
investigation. Unlike ordinary street crimes, such as theft or drug-dealing,
which are obviously criminal, economic crimes often involve business
transactions that are not inherently wrongful.146 While everyone assumes
that Enron was rife with criminality, the actual causes of its demise were
not theft or embezzlement, but rather, involved the use of sophisticated
financial vehicles and transactions that are recognized as perfectly
legitimate in most circumstances.147
If the assumption is that every investigation of organizational
misconduct will result in a criminal conviction, then the DOJ’s disdain for
lawyers would be defensible. But it is not always the case that the
corporation and its officers are engaged in wrongdoing. In a recent
prosecution of two mid-level executives from the K-Mart Corporation who
were accused of securities fraud, the government dismissed the charges
after its second witness contradicted her earlier grand jury testimony about
the receipt of documents that showed the defendants had not tried to

145. Thompson Memorandum, supra note 14, at Introduction.
146. See Green, supra note 13, at 510 (
Not only does white collar crime present difficulties in assessing the means by
which it is committed, the harms it causes, and the victims it affects, but there are
also problems in determining exactly who (or what, in the case of an entity) should
be held responsible. Many of the offenses referred to above are most likely to
occur within the context of complex institutions, such as large corporations,
partnerships, and government agencies. In such organizations, responsibility for
decision making and implementation is shared among boards of directors,
shareholders, top and mid-level managers, and ground-level employees. As a
result, the blame we attribute to an individual actor within the organization in
which he works may be less than the blame we attribute to an individual actor
committing an equally serious street crime on his own.
).
147. See Frank Partnoy, A Revisionist View of Enron and the Sudden Death of “May”,
48 VILL. L. REV. 1245, 1245-46 (2003) (“Enron is largely a story about derivatives—
financial instruments such as options, futures, and other contracts whose value is linked to
some underlying financial instrument or index. A close analysis of the facts shows that the
most prominent SPE [Special Purpose Entity] transactions were largely irrelevant to Enron’s
collapse, and that most of Enron’s deals with SPEs were arguably legal, even though
disclosure of those deals did not comport with economic reality. To the extent SPEs are
relevant to understanding Enron, it is the derivatives transactions between Enron and the
SPEs—not the SPEs themselves—that matter. Even more important were Enron’s
derivatives trades and transactions other than those involving the SPEs.”).

10/3/2005 1:35 PM

HENNING

2005]

TARGETING LEGAL ADVICE

699

deceive the company about the accounting for a transaction.148 Similarly,
the charges against the individuals arising from the Salt Lake City Olympic
bid scandal were dismissed at the close of the government’s case, and the
district court judge stated that the government’s case had offended his
sense of justice.149 Unlike the view of NYPD Blue, that “lawyering up” is
only done by guilty suspects to thwart an investigation, corporate officers
and employees do not necessarily act illegally in every instance, and their
reliance on lawyers is not designed simply to frustrate the government’s
investigation of clear wrongdoing.
CONCLUSION
The world might be a better place without lawyers, although I doubt it.
We hear quite frequently the quotation from Shakespeare’s Henry VI (Part
II)150—“The first thing we do, let’s kill all the lawyers.”151 However, we
are not quite sure how to react. Leave it to lawyers—and legal
academics—to argue whether that line was meant as a true wish for a better
world without lawyers or a compliment to lawyers because of their ability
to guard against despotism.152 However, lawyers are recognized as
important in the civil arena and constitutionally required in many criminal
cases. As Justice Stevens noted in a dissenting opinion:
If the Government, in the guise of a paternalistic interest in protecting
the citizen from his own improvidence, can deny him access to
independent counsel of his choice, it can change the character of our free
society. Even though a dispute with the sovereign may only involve
property rights, . . . the citizen’s right of access to the independent,
private bar is itself an aspect of liberty that is of critical importance in
our democracy.153

In the name of investigating corporate crime, the DOJ has given
expression to a mistrust of lawyers as little more than hindrances to the
protection of society from wrongdoing. We are told, in effect, that lawyers
cannot be trusted because their ethical rules permit them to obstruct justice,
148. See David Ashenfelter & Greta Guest, Charges Tossed in Kmart Crime Case,
DETROIT FREE PRESS, Nov. 8, 2003, at A1.
149. See Mike Gorrell & Linda Fantin, Acquitted, SALT LAKE TRIB., Dec. 6, 2003, at A1
(quoting the judge as stating: “In all my 40 years experience with the criminal justice
system . . . I have never seen a criminal case brought to trial that was so devoid of criminal
intent or evil purpose. . . . This, in light of the evidence presented, offends my sense of
justice.”).
150. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE SECOND PART OF KING HENRY THE SIXTH, act 4, sc. 2.
151. Id.
152. For various commentators’ interpretations of the Shakespeare quotation, see
Benjamin Barton, The Emperor of Ocean Park: The Quintessence of Legal Academia, 92
CAL. L. REV. 585, 600 n.46 (2004) (book review).
153. Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 370-71 (1985)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
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and their advice to clients to assert their constitutional rights makes it
appreciably more difficult to investigate and to prosecute economic crimes
committed by corporations and their officers and employees.
However, the DOJ’s suspicion of lawyers and the targeting of legal
advice as something to be limited or eliminated if possible from corporate
crime investigations are steps toward viewing all such allegations of
misconduct as proven unless—and until—determined otherwise. I submit
that this approach takes the issue of overcriminalization to a new level by
making the provision of proper legal advice an indicia of criminality and an
instrumentality to be removed from the hands of those subject to a criminal
investigation in much the same way an officer would take a weapon or
contraband from a suspect.

